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This paper reviews and integrates research from both within and outside the entrepre-
neurship field under the label of ‘situated cognition’. Situated cognition is the notion
that cognitive activity inherently involves perception and action in the context of a
human body situated in a real-world environment. The review concentrates on three
areas of the situated cognition literature that have significant implications for research
in entrepreneurial cognition: embedded, grounded and distributed cognition. While
these three aspects of cognition differ in terms of foci and core theses, they share the
common emphasis of viewing and investigating cognitive processes by going beyond the
individual mind and paying attention to the human body, (material) objects and other
people. Using the theoretical lens of situated cognition provides new insights into
current entrepreneurship phenomena such as co-creation and interaction in a shared
economy based on new technologies.
Introduction
Research into entrepreneurial cognition endeavors to
understand how some individuals identify and act to
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities, and why others
do not (McMullen and Shepherd 2006). Beginning
with the premise of bounded cognition, research in
the field has pursued questions around the ways in
which cognitive processes inhibit effectiveness in the
face of risks, ambiguities and uncertainties inherent
in the entrepreneurial process (e.g. research on
biases, heuristics and overconfidence) (Busenitz and
Barney 1997; Hayward et al. 2006). At the same
time, another body of research has explored ways in
which cognitive processes are sometimes adapted to
enable superior performance, e.g. research on pattern
recognition, meta cognition and expert scripts (Baron
and Ensley 2006; Haynie et al. 2010; Mitchell et al.
2000). However, whether geared to the inhibitors
or enablers of performance, the field has been
dominated largely by individualistic and static
conceptions of entrepreneurial cognitions that cog-
nition researchers have increasingly critiqued as
‘boxologies’ and rejected as an appropriate basis for
understanding cognition (Mitchell et al. 2011). The
prevailing conceptions of cognition, it is argued, fall
short of capturing the ‘gist’ (Shepherd and Sutcliffe
2011) of the phenomenon they purport to describe,
which is characterized by dynamism and inter-
activity. Therefore, scholars in the area have called
for new conceptualizations of entrepreneurial cogni-
tion that capture these inherent qualities of entrepre-
neurial phenomenon (Venkataraman et al. 2012).
This paper reviews and integrates research from
both within and outside the entrepreneurship field
under the label of ‘situated cognition’ (Clark 2010;
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Joas 1996; Robbins and Aydede 2009a; Wilson
2002). Situated cognition is the notion that cognitive
activity inherently involves perception and action in
the context of a human body situated in a real-world
environment (Mitchell et al. in press; Wilson 2002,
p. 626). Early sources of the fundamental ideas of
situated cognition can be traced at least to William
James and other 19th-century philosophers and psy-
chologists (Prinz 1987). Some important outcrops of
work have already appeared in the entrepreneurship
literature that embrace a situated view of cognition
(e.g. Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Cornelissen
et al. 2012; Doganova and Eyquem-Renault 2009;
Mitchell et al. 2011; Randolph-Seng et al. in press),
but we contend that the field has yet to pay enough
attention to the issues highlighted by this work and
by the broader literature on this topic. This review is
targeted at concisely analyzing and organizing
several of the major themes that have emerged in
situated cognition research and are relevant to the
investigation of entrepreneurial cognition, in order
to progress the development of research implica-
tions and opportunities for situated entrepreneurial
cognition research (Randolph-Seng et al. in
press).
As with any effort to review and import research
from a general field into a discipline such as entre-
preneurship, a central question is the identification
and choice of relevant theoretical issues. Many
examples of situated cognition discussed in the lit-
erature are epiphenomenal to entrepreneurship, i.e.
driving, making a presentation, holding a conversa-
tion, running a multi-person meeting, catching a
baseball or playing in a soccer game. These are all
things entrepreneurs might do (some of them on a
daily basis), but are not tasks or activities that are
distinctly entrepreneurial, that characterize the dis-
cipline of entrepreneurship. Some might even think
them to be trivial. This leads us to concentrate on a
few areas of the situated cognition literature where
we believe the cash value (James 1904) of theoreti-
cal insights from the broader field is the highest for
entrepreneurial cognition research. We organize
these in an analytical framework in Figure 1, which
differentiates key themes in the situated cogni-
tion literature that will form the focus of our
investigation.
Our framework recognizes and partially integrates
several proposed alternatives that have been offered
in the literature (Anderson 2003; Clancey 1997;
Clark 1999; Smith and Semin 2004; Wilson 2002)
for organizing what is a very broad and diverse body
of research encompassing psychology, cognitive
science, linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelli-
gence, social psychology and others (Clark 2010).
This work can be usefully summarized as in Figure 1
Figure 1. Research framework
2 N. Dew et al.
© 2014 British Academy of Management and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
in three major theses that collectively define work in
the area (Robbins and Aydede 2009a).
First, the ‘embedding thesis’ proposes that cogni-
tion is geared to action in the natural and social
environment, and therefore has evolved in myriad
ways to exploit objects and social structure available
in these environments (Clark 1997). As Hutchins
(2006, p. 394) describes it:
Human minds did not evolve in isolation, each
wrapped tightly in a thick skull and thereby insu-
lated from the complexities of the body and the
world. We know that the brain takes advantage of
minute details of the body and the body’s interac-
tion with the physical environment.
In fact, one of the most accepted propositions in the
whole of situated cognition research is the idea that
cognition is scaffolded and shaped in important ways
by material objects available in the environment
(Robbins and Aydede 2009b). While many aspects of
embedded cognition that are discussed in the litera-
ture (e.g. assembling a product by laying out the
pieces in the order and relationship they need to have
in the finished item – Wilson 2002, p. 629) only
peripherally relate to entrepreneurship, two aspects
that are highly relevant occur in the innovation
process. The role of cognitive offloading is signifi-
cant in the learning-by-doing process, and material
objects such as physical products (e.g. the personal
computer or the smartphone) are powerful sources of
interest, desire and passion that motivate entrepre-
neurial innovation. Thus, we highlight a general case
for better understanding the embedding of entrepre-
neurial activity in the material environment, in par-
ticular the role of specific objects that are such
central features of entrepreneurial work.
The second thesis holds that cognitive processes
have deep roots in the body, in particular in its sen-
sorimotor capabilities. It is referred to as the
‘embodiment thesis’ (Robbins and Aydede 2009b):
the idea that cognition ‘arises from bodily interac-
tions with the world’ (Thelen et al. 2001, p. 1).
Within this literature the role of the body has been
considered in several different ways. For example,
one way in which cognition is situated in the body is
observed in how we employ our bodies to grease the
wheels of our thought processes, e.g. through physi-
cal actions such as gesturing (Cornelissen et al.
2012; Goldin-Meadow and Wagner 2005; Hostetter
and Alibali 2008; Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 1998;
McNeill 2005). However, we consider many of these
themes to be peripheral to the central issues concern-
ing entrepreneurial cognition. Instead, the aspect of
embodiment we identify as the main concern is the
grounding of concepts, what Anderson (2003) calls
the ‘physical grounding project’ in the embodied
cognition literature (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). In
the past fifteen years the notion that our perceptual
systems at least partially ground our conceptual
systems has garnered considerable research support
(Barsalou 2010; Wilson 2002) and, as we will show,
grounded cognition is an idea that has significant
implications for the conceptualization of entrepre-
neurial behavior both by researchers and entrepre-
neurs themselves.
The third, most challenging, thesis is the claim
that, taken to its logical conclusion, ‘mind’ is best
understood as extending beyond the boundaries of
the individual to incorporate a broader system of
interacting elements, known as the ‘extended mind
thesis’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Robbins and
Aydede 2009b). Again, this thesis can be separated
into different claims that it is useful to disentangle
(Wilson 2002). The one that we are persuaded is most
relevant to entrepreneurial cognition research is
the idea that cognition is fundamentally distributed
across social agents (Hutchins 1995a; Smith and
Semin 2004). We therefore take up the issue of
socially distributed cognition (West 2007) by shifting
the unit of analysis for cognition to the collective
level and reviewing two mechanisms that facilitate
the distribution of cognition across social agents in
entrepreneurial situations. Here, our focus will be on
transactive memory and boundary objects (Star and
Griesemer 1989; Wegner 1987) though we recognize
that a wide range of contributions to this topic exist
(Klotz et al. 2014).
Collectively, these three theses paint an image of
cognitive process as highly interactive and rooted in
the physical, material and social context of individu-
als (Robbins and Aydede 2009a). This view of the
mind therefore rejects the image of cognition as
information processing that can be usefully
abstracted from the body and outside world (Smith
and Semin 2004), i.e. ‘[T]he cognitivist claim that
cognition is the rule-based manipulation of abstract
representations.’ (Anderson 2003, p. 126). This
image of pure information processing is the core
target of criticism from the situated cognition per-
spective. It is an image that can be succinctly
summed up as mentalism: the notion that the domain
of cognition research lies purely inside the head
(Agre 1997). Much of the research program of
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situated cognition therefore attacks the assumption
that agents think mainly using abstractions (analogs,
scripts and simulations of the world in the head),
arguing instead that cognition involves considerably
more than mental representation alone (Clark 2010).
Instead, connections to the body, the outside material
world and social others are theoretically salient for
understanding how the ‘full spectrum’ of thinking
occurs (Randolph-Seng et al. in press, p. 13). These
issues are important for entrepreneurial cognition
research because the theoretical lens of situated cog-
nition provides new insights to current entrepreneur-
ship phenomena such as co-creation and interaction
in a shared economy based on new technologies.
Of course, like every research topic, the notion of
situated entrepreneurial cognition stands on the
shoulders of much research that has come before. As
already referenced, several threads of work have
appeared in the entrepreneurship literature in recent
years that pertain to a situated cognitive perspective.
These are covered in more depth than we have space
for here by Randolph-Seng et al. (in press) and the
interested reader is encouraged to use that text as a
definitive reference for the progression of entrepre-
neurial cognition research towards a more situated
approach. Here we present a summative table (see
Table 1) that organizes several of the most important
pieces of work according to the main categories of
our exposition: embedded, grounded and distributed
cognition.
Starting with the notion of cognition being embed-
ded in the broader environment, perspectives on this
issue can be traced to work by Krueger et al. (2000)
that sought to broaden the investigation of entrepre-
neurial intentions to include the influence of situ-
ational factors on intentions. Baron (2008) also
portrayed affect as highly situational in his research
on the role of affect in entrepreneurship, a theme that
continued in work by Cardon and colleagues (Cardon
et al. 2009; Drnovšek et al. 2009), who built a model
of entrepreneurial passion that foregrounded, among
other things, the role of material objects as sources of
passion. At the same time, other researchers have
developed insights into the usefulness of grounded
cognition for entrepreneurship research. Two major
themes have been advanced here: first, the role of the
physics of the body and brain (Baucus et al. in press;
Nicolaou et al. 2008; White et al. 2007); and second,
the theme of conceptual embodiment, developed in
the work of Cornelissen and colleagues (Cornelissen
2013; Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Cornelissen
et al. 2012). Third, further work in entrepreneurial
cognition has also elaborated the issue of distributed
cognition, work that can be traced to contributions
made by Mitchell et al. (2000) in examining the
similarity in cognitive scripts used across cultures, to
de Carolis and Saparito (2006) on the distribution of
cognition across social networks and West (2007) on
collective cognition, through to recent work on
transactive memory in start-up teams (Zheng 2012).
The structure of this paper follows the contours
outlined in the introduction and exhibited in Table 1
and Figure 1. In the next section, we take up the issue
of the embeddedness of cognition, with a focus on
the role of material things in innovative work and as
objects of entrepreneurial passion. Following that,
our exposition turns to the grounding of cognition in
the body’s perceptual apparatus, i.e. the notion that
our conceptual systems are ultimately based in large
part on our physical perceptual and motor systems.
The fourth section takes up the distribution of cog-
nition among social agents, examining the twin
themes of boundary objects and transactive memory
as important mechanisms through which distributed
cognition is enabled. Finally, we circle back to a
discussion of key issues raised in our exposition, and
to questions about what research entrepreneurship
scholars might fruitfully engage in next to build
on the legacy that current work has established.
Throughout, we note that this review necessarily
cannot encompass everything of issue and every
work of research that knowledgeable scholars collec-
tively might point to, and readers are reminded that
the usual disclaimers apply.
Embedded cognition
Micro-processes of innovation
A key activity of entrepreneurs – widely regarded as
a sine qua non of the entrepreneurial role – is creat-
ing, adapting and bringing new ideas to market
(Baumol 2010; McMullen and Shepherd 2006;
Schumpeter 1976; Shane and Venkataraman 2000).
Very often, these innovations are material objects,
some famed examples synonymous with famed
entrepreneurs being luxury china (Josiah Wedgwood,
pictured at a table of them), personal computers
(Steve Jobs, cover of Time magazine cradling one),
the automobile (Henry Ford, the usual image is of
him sitting in one), and the airplane (Howard
Hughes, flying one – fast). Objects are something
that people act towards and with, which can include
representations (e.g. designs, ideas, theories that
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represent processes or services) as well as material
objects (e.g. products and goods) (Nicolini et al.
2012, p. 613, p. 617).
Recent entrepreneurship research (e.g.
Cornelissen et al. 2012) has explicitly highlighted
the physical role of human bodies and the material
things that they see, touch and connect with, in the
study of entrepreneurial cognition. This focus on
entrepreneurial bodies and material objects seems
natural because object-focused innovation pervades
entrepreneuring – particular material things are
frequently the primary reason why entrepreneurs
become entrepreneurs in the first place – and entre-
preneurs need bodies (as well as brains) to interact
with most, if not all, material objects (including other
people, in the case of service innovations).
Such research highlights the two-way physical
interaction between entrepreneurs and objects, and
Table 1. Entrepreneurship cognition research pertaining to situated cognition
Articles (date-ordered) Summary
Embedded cognition
Krueger et al. (2000) Highlights the influence of exogenous situational factors on entrepreneurial intentions,
indicating the embedded nature of intentions.
Baron (2008) Examines the role of affect in entrepreneurial decision-making, which is portrayed as highly
situational, hence environmentally embedded.
Cardon et al. (2009) Highlights the role of entrepreneurial passion, the importance of affect as an embodied
experience, and centrality of venture-related objects of passion.
Clarke (2011) Examines the role of visual symbols in entrepreneurial sense-giving.
Mitchell et al. (2011) Proposes usefulness of concept of socially situated cognition, drawing on Smith and Semin
(2004), and illustrated with examples from entrepreneurship literature.
Randolph-Seng et al. (in press) Proposes socially situated cognition as an overarching framework for research on
entrepreneurial cognition: ‘At the center of the socially situated cognition approach is the
idea that cognition is not static but situated within specific individuals and environments.’
Mitchell et al. (in press) Suggests ways to incorporate non-conscious cognitions into entrepreneurial cognition research,
emphasizing environmental factors that affect non-conscious cognitions, hence the
embeddedness of non-conscious cognition.
Drnovšek et al. (in press)] Introduces the concept of situated emotions.
Grounded cognition
Nicolaou et al. (2008) Influence of the body (genetics) on individuals’ propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activity.
White et al. (2007) Influence of the body (hormones, e.g. testosterone levels) on willingness to engage in
entrepreneurship.
Cornelissen and Clarke (2010) Argues for the incorporation of motor actions in sense-making by entrepreneurs: ‘[M]otor
actions involving physical movement or physically holding or manipulating an object’ shape
metaphorical induction about a new venture.’ (p. 547).
Clarke and Cornelissen (2011) Embraces an embodied view of cognition, suggesting that ‘words and grammatical
constructions will reference certain basic cognitive categories (e.g. objects, motion,
causation, agency, etc.).’
Cornelissen et al. (2012) Examines the use of gesturing and use of embodied metaphor in sense giving of entrepreneurs.
Cornelissen (2013) Uses examples of embodied cognition in life of Steve Jobs and Van Gogh.




Suggests that consistency in entrepreneurial cognitions across cultures indicates distributed
cognition occurs as common forms of entrepreneurial expertise.
De Carolis and Saparito (2006) Suggests that entrepreneurship is the result of the interplay of environment (i.e. social
networks) and cognition (i.e. cognitive biases) of entrepreneurs.
West (2007) Role of collective cognition in shaping an entrepreneurial venture.




Role of business models as boundary objects that play a role in network and market formation.
Zheng (2012) Role of transactive memory among venture founding teams.
Breugst et al. (2012) Shows how contagion of passion matters in explaining how employees’ perceptions of
entrepreneurial passion that influences employees’ commitment to ventures.
Mitchell et al. (in press) Introduce simulation to disembody and re-embody exchange cognitions.
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what Klemmer et al. (2006, p. 142) refer to as the
‘backtalk’ that objects provide. Using the example of
prototypes in the design of ubiquitous computing
devices (e.g. music players, mobile phones and
digital cameras), they argue that:
[P]hysical action and cognition are interconnected.
Successful product designs result from a series of
‘conversations with materials.’ Here, the ‘conversa-
tions’ are interactions between the designer and the
design medium – sketching on paper, shaping clay,
building with foam core . . . The epistemic produc-
tion of concrete prototypes provides the crucial
element of surprise, unexpected realizations that the
designer could not have arrived at without produc-
ing a concrete manifestation of her ideas. (Klemmer
et al. 2006, p. 142)
The transactions (‘conversation’) between mind,
body and world in this example foregrounds a major
theme from situated cognition research on embed-
ding: the idea of cognitive ‘off-loading’ (Robbins and
Aydede 2009b). Instead of generating a mental
model of the problem-solving requirement, storing it
and then manipulating it, we turn the problem into a
visual task where we physically manipulate the
object itself until we ‘see’ what works (Lindblom
1959). We therefore tune down the demands for a
full-blown cognitive representation of problem situ-
ations in favor of the more economical solution of
using the ‘world as its own model’ (Brooks 1991, p.
140) and the ‘world as an outside memory’ (O’Regan
1992, p. 461). Thus, our flow of thoughts depends on
repeated environmental interactions (Anderson
2003, p. 108; Clark 1997; Tribble 2005) rather than
on producing a cognitive model within which we step
back, observe, assess and plan our actions (Wilson
2002, p. 628).
As a theoretical mechanism off-loading is also
important in entrepreneurship because of a second
major theme in situated cognition research, which is
the role of physical interaction in learning. In observ-
ing child development, Piaget (1952) argued that
cognitive development requires both mental activity
and physical interaction in the world. This theme is
familiar to scholars of learning-by-doing in innova-
tion, which is widely considered to be a vital practice
in innovation (Von Hippel and Tyre 1995). Entrepre-
neurship involves much hands-on tinkering with
material objects: mock-ups, prototypes or pre-
production products (Bettiol et al. 2013; Rosenberg
1976). It is easier for entrepreneurs to cognitively
lean on the world by physically manipulating mock-
ups (Thomke 2003) than it is to engage in building a
complete cognitive model of a new product design,
and then producing that design. Despite the recurring
image of the entrepreneur as someone experiencing
an ‘Aha!’ moment in which a metaphorical light bulb
comes on, the situated cognition literature suggests
instead that the development of new product ideas is
something that happens in much more of a hands-on
fashion, where entrepreneurs build material objects
in order to think and experience incremental ‘Ahas’
(Bettiol et al. 2013, p. 5). In reviewing two books on
the lives of Van Gogh and Steve Jobs respectively,
Cornelissen (2013) observes:
[B]odily actions, including speech, gesturing and
drawing, do not simply express previously formed
mental concepts but they are part and parcel of the
very activity in which conceptualizations and infer-
ences are formed . . . Van Gogh and Jobs are the
very embodiment of this very insight in that every
physical stroke or design choice provoked further
thoughts and ideas and led them to refine their
thinking about a particular painting or product.
(Cornelissen 2013, pp. 16–17)
Thus, learning emerges from interacting with and
manipulating material objects that grease the wheels
of the thought process.
Numerous other examples underscore the notion
that entrepreneurs build things and physically inter-
act with them in order to think better about innova-
tive problem-solving. The notion of constructing
some type of workable, recognizable material object
(Jacob 1977) has long been highlighted as a critical
stepping stone in the innovation process, suggesting
that materiality is vital to the process. In a study of
debugging new manufacturing equipment Tyre and
Von Hippel (1997, p. 76) found that, in all but two of
the 27 problems studied, some direct visual inspec-
tion was necessary for engineers to grasp the nature
of the problem, concluding that, ‘Seeing, touching,
and manipulating are obviously important avenues
for improving understanding, just as hearing and
explaining are; yet, they are nearly overlooked in the
organizational literature.’ In a recent study of design
processes, the authors highlight that the latest digital
design technologies were used sometimes, though
less often than low-tech methods such as quick con-
struction of models using paper, cardboard, plywood
and other cheap materials (Austin et al. 2012). This
preference for low-tech, craft-based design makes
6 N. Dew et al.
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perfect sense when the situated nature of cognition is
understood. The human brain has remarkable mental
simulation capabilities (i.e. imagination). However,
these capacities are limited by the brain’s short-term
memory capacity. It is much easier to off-load some
of these simulation requirements, replacing the need
for a complex internal model with ‘seeing’ by build-
ing a prototype and then physically manipulating it
(Klemmer et al. 2006). What mental simulation does
occur is made easier by using a prototype or model as
a tangible anchor for cognitive manipulations
(Hutchins 1995a), with problem-solving routines
entailing repeated interaction between internal rep-
resentation and computations, on the one hand, and
manipulation of the material object, on the other
(Anderson 2003).
Focusing on the role of tinkering as an important
component of innovation is, of course, not new in
innovation studies: Rosenberg (1976) and others
long ago made the persuasive case that, when one
breaks open the black box of innovation, one finds a
craft, more than a science, historically dominated by
hands-on tinkering that occurs in ‘innumerable small
increments . . .’ (Geroski 2003; Mokyr 1990;
Rosenberg 1976, p. 78). The vast majority of all firms
have no R&D budget (Nooteboom 1994) and tech-
nical improvements are typically individually very
modest. Current explanations of these processes tend
to focus attention on explanatory factors that are
extra-cognitive, e.g. on the locus and stickiness of
information (von Hippel 1994). Situated cognition
research adds insight about why innovation is
approached in the very hands-on way it is, even in the
presence of high-tech alternatives (Austin et al.
2012; Klemmer et al. 2006) by highlighting how off-
loading changes the ratio of material to cognitive
inputs, thus leveraging cognitive embeddedness to
improve task performance. This suggests that not
only does the location and stickiness of information
matter, but that bodies, material objects and cogni-
tion are ‘constitutively entangled’ (Orlikowski 2007,
p. 1437) in the performance of innovative work.
Objects of passion: situated
entrepreneurial motivation
By nature, innovative work is typically hard work
with uncertain outcomes, and therefore intrinsic
motivation matters significantly in entrepreneurship
(Locke and Baum 2007). According to motivation
theory (Heckhausen and Heckhausen 2008) motiva-
tion is object-bounded and, thus, objects are drivers
of motivation. It is just as well, then, that entrepre-
neurs often seem obsessed with the objects they are
trying to create, or create a market for (Cardon et al.
2009). Being embedded in a world of material
objects matters not just because it affects micro-
processes of innovation, but also because entrepre-
neurs frequently have special relationships with
specific objects (or objectified ideas) – relationships
that are influential in motivating them to do what
they do. For Howard Schultz, the founder of
Starbucks, it was the Italian Espresso bar (Davis
et al. 2013), and his passion for it was manifest in his
biography, PourYour Heart Into It (Schultz and Jones
Yang 1997). For Steve Jobs it was the personal com-
puter, which he was obsessed about making ‘insanely
great’ for over 30 years (Chen et al. 2009). For
Rudolf Diesel, it was the diesel engine, with the
process of materializing it almost comically
described by Latour (1987). In fact, when it turned
out that after much tinkering the initial batch of
diesel engines kept breaking down and stopping
working, Diesel himself had a nervous breakdown
(Latour 1987, p. 106). Obsessions with particular
types of objects drove the working (and personal)
lives of these entrepreneurs and many others (Koehn
2000), making passion one of the most observed
phenomenon in entrepreneurship (Smilor 1997).
Indeed, it is hard to think of Schultz, Jobs or Diesel
without thinking of the objects that motivated them.
Material objects can therefore tell us a lot about
why entrepreneurs innovate and found new ventures
to propagate their innovations in the first place.
Entrepreneurial motivation is situated because it is
embedded in material relations (Drnovšek et al. in
press). Recent entrepreneurship research has noted
this connection between material objects and power-
ful sources of motivation such as entrepreneurial
passion. Cardon et al. (2009, pp. 515–516) suggest
that ‘[P]assion involves “intense longing” that one
feels for objects or activities that are deeply mean-
ingful to one’s identity, whether those objects are
real, remembered, desired, imagined, or anticipated’.
Passion is frequently described as the fire of desire
that motivates entrepreneurs to persist with their
efforts when obstacles occur (Chen et al. 2009). The
literature therefore draws connections between entre-
preneurial passion and performance outcomes
(Baum and Locke 2004), funding success (Chen
et al. 2009) and employee commitment (Breugst
et al. 2012), citing the contagion effects of passion
(Cardon 2008). However, in their review of numer-
ous papers on entrepreneurial passion, Cardon et al.
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(2009, p. 512) draw the conclusion that in compari-
son with other work, we know little about the ante-
cedents of passion. Furthermore, they characterize
the literature as ‘vague in identifying the object of
entrepreneurial passion’ and observe that ‘the cen-
trality of venture-related objects appears evident in
conceptualizing entrepreneurial passion, but sup-
porting theoretical work is lacking’.
Fortunately, contemporary literature on social
studies of technology has examined the work objects
perform in motivating action in some detail (Latour
1996; Nicolini et al. 2012; Orlikowski 2007;
Vygotsky 1986). The theoretical framing of objects
as foci of desire derives from the idea of epistemic
objects (Cetina 1997; Rheinberger 1997), which can
be understood as a theory of emotional attachment to
objects. Objects are theorized to provide a source of
interest and motivation for entrepreneurial work
because of their incompleteness and open-
endedness. They are, so to speak, in need of being
achieved (McClelland 1962) and the pursuit of
achieving fuels emotional investment in and attach-
ment to them (Baron 2007; Damasio 1994). The
drive and desire to accomplish the object therefore
lies at the root of an entrepreneur–object relation-
ship, and these relationships can have a ‘deep emo-
tional holding power’ over the entrepreneur, who may
experience an ‘intimate attachment’ to their particu-
lar object of desire (Nicolini et al. 2012, p. 614).
From the foregoing, the theory of epistemic
objects provides a persuasive explanation of the
intrinsic motivation to innovate, which rests in part in
the object itself (Heckhausen and Heckhausen 2008).
The pursuit of something concrete – for example, a
material object as a focus of the work – can help
infuse energy and passion into a venture. Such
objects can take many forms, including physical
manifestations (diagrams, flowcharts) of new social
arrangements, processes or services. But until the
object is manifest, everything is talk and hot air. The
innovation process is therefore partly grounded by
the appearance of things at critical junctures – even if
they are things that sometimes fall apart and have to
be put back together again, as was the case with
Rudolf Diesel’s diesel engines (Latour 1987). Thus
innovative works-in-progress, prototypes, semi-
created, partial things – but things nonetheless – are
material objects that make a venture real, and there-
fore are important fuel for mobilizing entrepre-
neurial behaviors (Swan et al. 2007).
Of course, entrepreneurial skills, traits and net-
works all matter: we are not saying they do not. Per
Nicolini et al. (2012, p. 613), we do not subscribe to
the view that objects alone explain entrepreneurial
innovation, only that a cognitive fundamental – moti-
vation – is actively shaped by objects when entrepre-
neurs have a special relationship with them, as they
often do (Smith and Semin 2004). In these instances
entrepreneurial behavior cannot be made complete
sense of without incorporating the fact that the
activities we observe are in part the way they are
because of what entrepreneurs are after, and not
simply because of who the entrepreneur is (their per-
sonality characteristics), or because of their capabili-
ties (human capital) or because they are inherently
predisposed to such feelings (Cardon et al. 2009).
Take away the objects, and it is like studying Howard
Schultz without the coffee bar, Bill Gates without
Windows, Milton Hershey without the chocolate,
Enzo Ferrari without something fast and red, or
studying Guy Laliberté in the absence of the clowns,
the tent and the acrobats (that are Cirque du Soleil).
The inherent involvement of material objects with
entrepreneurial motivation suggests that the motives
for entrepreneurship cannot be solely ‘in the head’,
because such motivation is fundamentally situated,
existing in the dynamic interaction of the brain with
the material and social world in the making
(Drnovšek et al. in press).
Grounded cognition
Embodied concepts
Ever wonder why new ventures are described as ‘piv-
oting’ in response to market opportunities (Ries
2011) or why new markets are described as ‘blue
oceans’ (Kim and Mauborgne 2005) or why a new
technology gets described as the ‘face of things to
come’? The explanation for these particular descrip-
tions and many more like them rests with research on
grounded cognition (Barsalou 2010).
Grounded cognition research highlights that cog-
nitive tasks can be differentiated between online
tasks where there is close-coupling between the
agent and the environment (e.g. time-pressured inter-
action) and off-line tasks that are decoupled from
immediate interaction with the environment
(Robbins and Aydede 2009a; Wilson 2002). Typical
examples of online tasks might be presenting a busi-
ness plan to potential investors (Chen et al. 2009;
Martens et al. 2007), running a staff meeting, driving
a car or playing a soccer game (Clark 1997); activi-
ties in which perceptual information continues to
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flow while cognitive processes are being carried out
(Wilson 2002). We routinely use our embodiment in
such tasks: gesturing is an example of how online,
live-time action is made easier by leveraging the
body in order to think better (Cornelissen et al. 2012;
Goldin-Meadow and Wagner 2005; Hostetter and
Alibali 2008; Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 1998;
McNeill 2005).
However, much of the type of thinking that entre-
preneurial cognition researchers have typically con-
cerned themselves with is more likely to be carried
out off-line, occurring in the absence of immediate
task-relevant inputs and outputs. Robbins and
Aydede (2009b, p. 4) describe off-line processing as
occurring when we disengage from the immediate
environment, ‘[T]o plan, reminisce, speculate, day-
dream, or otherwise think beyond the confines of the
here and now’. Off-line entrepreneurial cognitions
could include searching for opportunities (Shane and
Venkataraman 2000), imagining new products or ser-
vices (Baker and Nelson 2005; Klein 2008), vision-
ing market possibilities (Kirzner 1979), evaluating
the feasibility and desirability of potential ventures
(McMullen and Shepherd 2006) and planning par-
ticular courses of action (Frese et al. 2007). A key
question for these types of off-line cognitions is how
mental representations such as ‘opportunities’ come
to have the meanings they do? (Anderson 2003;
Harnad 1990; Prinz 2002). Why does the concept of
opportunity (for example) make sense to entrepre-
neurs, or entrepreneurship cognition researchers, in
the first place? What kind of sense does it make?
The grounded approach to cognition suggests that
opportunities, pivoting, blue oceans and being the
face of things to come are all examples of a more
general phenomenon that the words, concepts and
representations we routinely use have meaning
because we can ultimately index them to the percep-
tual experiences we have in the real world, rather than
deriving their meaning from the relationships
between abstract, amodal symbols (Barsalou 2010;
Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Semin and Smith
2008; Wilson 2002). If this approach is correct, then
off-line cognition is ultimately based in our percep-
tual and motor systems, and is contingent on our
ability to move in the world (Anderson 2003, p. 126;
Cornelissen and Clarke 2010, p. 547; Lakoff and
Johnson 1999). This would mean that the very ways
in which we are able to think – our most advanced
cognitions – are ultimately shaped by the ways in
which our cognitive systems use our bodies and envi-
ronments as ‘external informational structures that
complement internal representations. In turn, inter-
nal representations have a situated character, imple-
mented via simulations in the brain’s modal systems,
making them well suited for interfacing with external
structures.’ (Barsalou 2010, p. 717).
Evidence for the grounding hypothesis is strongest
for concepts that involve visual and motor imagery
because this is where concepts have the clearest rela-
tionship with perception and action. For an illustra-
tive example, take Cornelissen’s (2013) account of
Steve Jobs’ rationale for the iPod:
The rationale for the iPod, as a portable music
player, pretty much grew out of the development of
iTunes, the inference being that storing your music
would naturally lead Apple to develop a playing
device. But it also came about because of Steve
Jobs’ fanatical love for music. Isaacson describes in
the book the admiration Jobs had for songwriters
such as Bob Dylan as well as how he frequently
recounted his very eclectic taste in music. This
fanaticism gave Jobs a defining insight: he reasoned
that we all build up our very personal archives of
music with scores of purchased CDs reflecting our
own taste. Our own music collections are by their
very nature personal, and he in turn made the meta-
phorical association that if something is personal to
us it is physically close to us (as opposed to distant).
The typical association is that we metaphorically
liken things that are personal, such as emotionally
important relationships and friends, as physically
close to our own bodies. The inference that came
from this imaginative leap was that Jobs felt Apple
needed to develop a portable music player, so that
you could take your personal music collection with
you – literally kept it close to you – wherever you
went. (Cornelissen 2013, p. 15)
In this example, Cornelissen relates how higher-
order cognitions about what is personal and emotion-
ally important can be traced back to their bodily
bases, in this case dominated by perceptions of
physical closeness. Grounded cognition researchers
add that, if it turns out that much of our thinking is
similarly rooted in our experiences of space, then it
would not be surprising that these instances inherit ‘a
kind of reasoning – a sense of how concepts connect
and flow – which has its origin in, and retains the
structure of, our bodily coping with space’
(Anderson 2003, p. 105).
If grounding is implicated in cognition quite
broadly, in the way researchers are coming to believe
it is, it raises profound implications for how we think
about key concepts in entrepreneurship. Pioneering
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work in entrepreneurship by Cornelissen and Clarke
(2010, p. 547) and Cornelissen et al. (2012) has
already pointed the way to a deeper consideration of
the role of embodied concepts in the field by high-
lighting how concepts used in entrepreneurship are
grounded in human motor actions, physical move-
ment and perceptions of space, much as Lakoff and
Johnson (1999) and others have argued them to be.
These concepts (for example, planning as movement
along a straight line (Cornelissen et al. 2012, p. 223)
or technology commercialization as a journey with a
prospective destination (Cornelissen et al. 2012, p.
228)) are also observed to be reinforced by and
through the gestures entrepreneurs use to convey
their meaning. Matching gestures can be considered
to be a further indication of the perceptual grounding
of concepts (Cornelissen et al. 2012, p. 218).
Cornelissen and Clarke (2010, p. 546) add that we
should expect less experienced entrepreneurs to rou-
tinely use grounded concepts to induce and subse-
quently give sense to their business ideas, whereas
the more experienced are expected to use ready-to-
hand industry-specific analogies drawn from prior
experiences.
To further illuminate these issues, we apply Lakoff
and Johnson’s (1999) approach to analyzing con-
cepts as body-based metaphors to the concepts of
‘opportunity’ and ‘market’, which are both theoreti-
cally prominent in entrepreneurship. We may not
consciously think of these concepts in metaphorical
terms, yet an important prediction of the grounded
cognition literature is that our concepts are generally
structured in ways that reflect our physical embodi-
ment, in particular reflecting our constant spatial
experience in the world (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).
Our basic level conceptualizations of this type
happen below the level of consciousness and are
therefore involuntary.
Opportunities are valuable, hidden objects
Take the concept of opportunities (Dimov 2007,
2010). Much of the entrepreneurship literature on
opportunities has its roots in the foundational work
of Austrian economists (Shane 2000; Shane and
Venkataraman 2000), in particular Israel Kirzner’s
portrait of the role of entrepreneurs in the market
process (Kirzner 1979, 1997). Kirzner’s arguments
rely on a system of metaphors in which opportunities
are treated in much the same way as we commonly
conceptualize ideas – as objects. Central to Kirzner’s
oevre is that opportunities are a rather special type of
object: they are valuable, hidden objects. This leads
Kirzner to use the metaphor of grasping an object to
conceptualize how entrepreneurs behave: ‘[T]he
entrepreneur grasps the opportunities for pure profit
. . .’ (Kirzner 1997, p. 69). The conceptualization of
opportunities as objects is palpable from Kirzner’s
use of the term ‘grasping’, but also from the action
metaphor that Kirzner applies, which is ‘discovery’
(Hayek 1978) and from the associated metaphors that
an opportunity might ‘slip through the entrepre-
neur’s fingers’, that opportunity has to be ‘seized’
once it is discovered, that opportunities can be
‘pursued’ by entrepreneurs, that entrepreneurs some-
times ‘get their hands on opportunities’ (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999, p. 197).
The metaphorical entailments of opportunities
being hidden objects can be traced to the many ways
in which opportunities are described in the literature
(Venkataraman et al. 2008), for example:
• Entrepreneurs must discover opportunities that are
otherwise out of sight.
• Some people are more alert than others at spotting
opportunities.
• Some individuals may find and recognize them.
• Others overlook them or miss them completely.
• Opportunities can be elusive because they are
concealed.
• Some entrepreneurs may have an internal compass
that orients them in the direction of opportunities.
• Other entrepreneurs have better judgment about
where opportunities are to be found.
Much of conceptual system surrounding opportuni-
ties in the entrepreneurship literature traces out other
logical entailments of the ‘opportunities are valuable
hidden objects’ metaphor, in the same way as Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) analyze the work of major phi-
losophers as being composed of tracing out the
entailments of specific metaphors. Kirzner’s notion
of grasping opportunities by ‘piercing the fog of
uncertainty’ (Kirzner 1985, p. 53) is a particularly
colorful example, building on the opportunity meta-
phor with the metaphor of uncertainty as a form of
visual impairment (owing to fog).
It is important to note that the ultimate point of
tracing the metaphorical structure of these concep-
tual systems is the insight that they are both enabled
and constrained by being grounded in the body’s
modal systems (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). For
example, opportunities as valuable hidden objects
predisposes us to a hunter-gatherer worldview of
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opportunities and therefore the types of entrepre-
neurial action that might work in that worldview.
This masks alternatives, such as an agricultural
worldview in which opportunities might be planted,
nurtured, grown and harvested, or a creative
worldview in which opportunities are fabricated,
constructed, devised and engineered (Venkataraman
et al. 2008).
Markets are containers
Using a similar approach, one can analyze the
concept of markets via the ‘Markets are containers’
metaphor. Long ago, Fernand Braudel quizzically
remarked: ‘[I]s it possible to “locate” the market in
its proper place? This is not as easy as it might look,
because the word “market” is itself equivocal.’
(Braudel 1982, p. 223). One way of resolving this
equivocality is to conceive markets in the way we
perceive the world, which was already hinted at in
Braudel’s comment: many things are experienced as
having distinct boundaries, and when they do not, we
project boundaries on them by conceptualizing them
as containers (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 477;
1999, p. 32). Such spatial-relations concepts ‘are at
the heart of our conceptual system. (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999, p. 30).
Containers have a gestalt structure: a boundary, an
inside, an outside. The container schema can be
physically instantiated (a room, a soccer field) and
also imposed as a conceptual schema, as it frequently
is for markets. Consider the conceptualization of
markets by Fligstein (2001) as an example that
makes the container schema overt. We see Fligstein
(2001) describing the market as an arena, which has
a classic container structure. Sellers and buyers meet
‘in’ the arena, they can be ‘inside’ it or on the
‘outside’; when they want to trade they have to
‘enter’ the market. Elsewhere, Fligstein uses the field
metaphor, another type of container. The container
concept also became the foundation for Porter’s
(1980) approach to analyzing industries: the way to
keep the market from ‘overflowing’ with competitors
(too many ‘players’ spilling over the rim of the con-
tainer) was to ‘erect barriers to entry’ (make the walls
higher and more difficult to scale) that would ‘con-
strain’ the ‘mobility’ of would-be competitors (Caves
and Porter 1977). This straightforward appeal to the
container metaphor draws on the notion of physical
boundaries that can ‘impose forceful and visual con-
straints: it can protect a container’s contents, restrict
their motion . . .’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 32).
Thus Porter traces out the entailments of the con-
tainer metaphor. Research in entrepreneurship
appeals to the same conceptual metaphors when
describing international market entry by entrepre-
neurial firms (Zahra et al. 2000). Consider the fol-
lowing avalanche of spatial concepts clustered in
this description of international entrepreneurship
activity:
The number of productive opportunities open to a
firm also multiplies when the firm enters a new
market (Brush 1992; Penrose 1959). Entry gives the
firm firsthand knowledge of the market and con-
nects it with competitors, customers, suppliers, and
innovation centers outside its domestic market
(Birkinshaw 2000) – that is, the firm begins to build
positional advantages within the new market.
(Sapienza et al. 2006, p. 920)
Further entailments of the markets as containers
metaphors frequently appear in research about, and
conversations by, entrepreneurs (Venkataraman et al.
2008). For example:
• We have to get ahead of the competition in
entering the market.
• We have to get to market first.
• We are exploring different market niches with this
idea.
• We don’t know yet which market space we should
be in.
• One firm has ticked a piece of an open market to
corral all to themselves.
• They are locking into a single area of that market.
• We have to protect our market leadership by
blocking further entry.
• We have occupied a particular market niche.
• We are pushing into new market segments.
To sum up, the basis of mental representation is
embodied metaphor, i.e. opportunities are objects to
be found, markets are spaces with barriers, gaps can
be found in those spaces, and niches positioned in
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999). As Cornelissen and
Clarke (2010) put it:
[E]ntrepreneurs often refer to ‘leveraging’ a client
base, ‘building’ market awareness, ‘expanding’
market share, ‘acquiring’ market acceptance
(Martens et al. 2007, p. 1118) . . . In this way they
metaphorically suggest that they can physically
manipulate and control markets as if these were
objects. (Cornelissen and Clarke 2010, p. 547)
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Innovative entrepreneurs pivot business models and
change venture direction towards grasping new
opportunities and disrupting existing market spaces.
Recent entrepreneurship trends of technology-driven
new markets such as 3D printing, big data, wearables
(Google Glass), drivables (Google Car), flyables
(Amazon’s helicopter delivery) or commercial space
travel (Spaceship One, SpaceX) could therefore be
better explained with the grounded cognition of the
embodiment thesis instead of relying on a purely
information-processing phenomenon (Shane 2000).
Distributed cognition
The idea of distributed cognition
In this section we shift the focus of analysis to the
role of ‘other’ individuals in cognition, i.e. to high-
light that cognition is distributed across multiple
agents. The distributed cognition thesis foregrounds
the social aspects of cognition, that individual
cognition involves cognitive transactions with
other people as well as the shared use of certain
types of material objects. If the basic insight of
embeddedness is that we ‘lean’ on the world in ways
that enhance our cognition, the distributed cognition
thesis adds that the same principle holds when other
people are the source of information and knowledge
storage. Hence the idea that cognition is fundamen-
tally distributed across social agents (Mitchell et al.
2011; Smith and Semin 2004).
The idea of distributed cognition is important
because much entrepreneurial activity involves
learning and spillovers from entrepreneur to entre-
preneur, who do not work alone, but interactively and
collectively (Friedel 2007; Garud and Karnøe 2003;
Latour 1987; Uzzi 1997). In such systems, much of
what we seek to understand about cognition takes
place outside the heads of individuals, instead occur-
ring in the interplay between them and other
individuals that participate in the system. Similar
observations led Hutchins (1995b, p. 267) to con-
clude that we can therefore, ‘[D]o a lot of research on
the cognitive properties of such a system . . . without
saying anything about the processes that operate
inside individual actors’. Smith and Semin (2004, p.
90) point out that this idea ‘may seem odd’ if a priori
one limits the notion of cognition to something that
only individual brains can do, but it ceases to seem
odd if we instead consider cognition as a system-
level property, arising among the actors that consti-
tute a social system.
In this section of the paper, we selectively review
two concepts that fit well within the idiom of dis-
tributed cognition and have already received con-
siderable attention in the wider organizations
literatures but are underdeveloped in entrepre-
neurial cognition research: ‘transactive memory’
(Hollingshead 1998; Wegner 1987; Zheng 2012)
and ‘boundary objects’ (Carlile 2004; Spee and
Jarzabkowski 2009; Star and Griesemer 1989).
These concepts meet two key criteria to be included
in this review: first, their efficacy and relevance to
entrepreneurship is already proved by prior research
using these ideas in the entrepreneurship domain
(e.g. Doganova and Eyquem-Renault 2009; Zheng
2012) and, second, they are well-developed con-
cepts with a broader literature that typifies the dis-
tributed cognition perspective by shifting the
analysis to the system level in which multiple
agents play a role in cognition. For these reasons,
boundary objects and transactive memory both have
the potential to scaffold future research on distrib-
uted cognition in entrepreneurship. We note that
these concepts should be considered in the context
of prior work in entrepreneurship that has already
identified sense-making and sense-giving as core
issues in thinking about distributed cognition
(Cornelissen and Clarke 2010).
Transactive memory: mind extension with
other people
Transactive memory is ‘[T]he shared division of cog-
nitive labor with respect to the encoding, storage,
retrieval and communication of information from
different knowledge domains, which often develops
in close relationships’ (Brandon and Hollingshead
2004, p. 633). In a quite literal sense, transactive
memory is the insight that other people are a key
external resource for information and knowledge
(Austin 2003). This insight is usually attributed to
Wegner’s (1987) study of married couples, which
highlighted that, by specializing in particular types of
information, married couples performed better on
recall tasks than pairs of strangers. Wegner argued
that this reflects the performance of a memory
system among the married couples that consists in
each person’s knowledge repository plus mutual
access to that knowledge via an indexing system,
with is some degree of shared knowledge about who
knows what (Wegner 1987). Thus, a transactive
memory system can be thought of as ‘a network of
interconnected individual memory systems and the
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transfer of knowledge among them’ (Majchrzak et al.
2007, p. 151).
Transactive memory therefore reflects social cou-
pling in a distributed cognitive system in which the
performance of the system is in part due to each
actors’ ability to access information and knowledge
of other actors. Thus, actors cognitively ‘lean’ on
each other, with their individual performances
cognitively interdependent with other actors in the
system (Brandon and Hollingshead 2004). However,
with this interdependence comes a pragmatic divi-
sion of cognitive labor that enables individuals to
specialize in particular types of knowledge, a spe-
cialization that benefits the system performance.
Indeed, research indicates that real working teams’
extensive communication routines (regular email,
phone, face-to-face, formal and informal conversa-
tions) leads them to develop fit-for-task transactive
memory systems quite organically (Majchrzak et al.
2007).
The concept of transactive memory therefore falls
naturally within the frame of situated cognition
research as a well worked-out mechanism by which
actors cognitively benefit from being around one
another (Clark 1997): ‘[T]he cognitive powers of the
individual mind are enhanced by socially available
and accessible scaffolds. . . . [T]his interdependent
system is able to supply a more elaborate memory
than any individual member’ (Smith and Semin
2004, p. 93). Indeed, De Carolis and Saparito (2006,
p. 41) argue that it makes sense to generalize this
insight into the notion that ‘entrepreneurial behavior
is a result of the interplay of environments (i.e.,
social networks) and certain cognitive biases in
entrepreneurs’.
The cognitive benefits of distributed cognition
derive from shifting cognitive load to other people,
using others to cue and prompt recall, and producing
new knowledge and information by brainstorming
with others, leading to faster problem-solving
(Sutton and Hargadon 1996). For example, in his
study of firms in the New York fashion industry, Uzzi
(1997) observed that firms routinely lean on their
social networks as external storehouses of informa-
tion and knowledge that is retrieved when needed for
joint problem-solving activity. Such benefits have
traditionally been framed differently in the entrepre-
neurship literature, which has focused on the entre-
preneur’s distinctive knowledge as a facility for
discovering opportunities that are unavailable to
others (Shane 2000) and on the strategic use of social
positions that provide privileged information access
(Burt 2009). Yet the dispersion of knowledge is
double-edged. Closely held, it creates opportunities
by compartmentalizing knowledge, which individu-
als benefit from when they can uniquely access it.
Distributed, it also creates opportunities for deepen-
ing the collective knowledge base and using it by
providing shared access to it.
Observations about the fundamental distribution
of information and knowledge (and its economic
consequences) are a familiar feature of entrepre-
neurial research, and can be traced back to Hayek
(1945). While Hayek’s commitment to methodologi-
cal individualism led him to view cognition in
atomistic terms (the plans of individual agents), the
insight of situated cognition research is rather to see
what analytical insights can be had from enlarging
our view of cognition. This insight fits well with
current entrepreneurship research on new ventures,
which emphasizes that the locus of entrepreneurial
activity often involves several individuals acting in a
team. New ventures are commonly founded by teams
rather than individuals (Klotz et al. 2014). This raises
important questions about the mechanisms that link
the team to venture performance, which includes
team-level cognitive processes (Grégoire et al. 2011;
West 2007), since the efficiency and effectiveness
with which teams use and coordinate their knowl-
edge, skills and abilities ought to affect venture per-
formance (Zheng 2012). Research on founding
teams vs. solo founders corroborates this expecta-
tion, finding that teams perform better than individu-
als (Cooper and Bruno 1977; Davidsson and Honig
2003; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Klotz
et al. 2014). While some researchers have pointed
out the potential negative effects of larger teams,
such as challenges of coordination and communica-
tion (Blau 1970; Hare et al. 1965), or have attributed
the performance enhancement of larger teams vs.
solo founders to the resource of more available man-
power, enabling working in parallel on various tasks
(e.g. Davidsson and Honig 2003), others have rather
highlighted the performance enhancement attributed
to the combined brainpower of the team. Thus
Zheng’s (2012) study of the transactive memory
systems of 98 Chinese start-ups finds that higher
levels of transactive memory had positive effects on
new venture performance, leading Zheng (2012, p.
580) to suggest that ‘transactive memory systems
enable team members to assimilate and transfer
information in a more organized manner, reducing
the cognitive resource demand for the entire team’.
We add that it is not much of a leap to conclude from
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these results that ventures with better developed
transactive memory systems can be said to ‘think’
better than those with less well-developed systems.
Boundary objects as mediators of
distributed cognition
Highly visible, shared material objects such as hos-
pital patient records, air traffic controller paper tapes
and workflow charts are conspicuous tools for coor-
dinating the action of multiple individuals in many
complex environments (Klemmer et al. 2006). The
production, manipulation and physical handover of
such material objects support collaboration precisely
because they are made visible to colleagues. The
notion of boundary objects has a similar logic: they
are artifacts that serve as triangulation points for
individuals from different thought worlds and knowl-
edge communities. Examples of boundary objects
include tangible objects such as software programs,
maps and scientific equipment (Nicolini et al. 2012)
as well as more abstract objects such as strategy
tools, concepts and stories (Bartel and Garud 2009;
Spee and Jarzabkowski 2009). Nicolini et al. (2012)
stress that an object’s status as a boundary object is
not an inherent property of the object itself, but is
contingent on the unfolding of work going on around
it: ‘[T]he role and function of particular objects can
change during the course of collaboration. The same
object can thus take center stage or shift into the
background at different times’ (p. 612).
Such observations have an air of familiarity to
entrepreneurship researchers, because several mate-
rial objects are very common and conspicuous in the
entrepreneurial process, and serve to organize it in
important ways. Among these are business ideas,
prototypes, entrepreneurial opportunities, business
models and business plans. Collectively, this set of
objects composes an infrastructure that serves the
entrepreneurial process. Traditionally, researchers
conceptualized these objects mostly through an
essentialist lens, i.e. as instruments in the venture
creation process. For example, business ideation has
been intensively researched in terms of its role in
predicting new venture success (Åstebro and
Elhedhli 2006; Goldenberg et al. 2001), the instru-
mental efficiency of business planning has received
considerable attention over decades of research
(meta analyzed by Brinckmann et al. 2010), the role
of business model innovation in value creation has
been investigated (Zott and Amit 2013), and the use
of prototypes has also been explored, in particular in
relation to new venture or new product success
(Kakati 2003; Mullins and Sutherland 1998; Ries
2011). Business plans provide a vivid example of
boundary objects, since they tend to bridge diverse
actors – the entrepreneur, co-founders, employees,
potential investors, suppliers and bankers. They
exhibit the dominant characteristic of boundary
objects highlighted in the literature – interpretive
flexibility (Star 2010; Star and Griesemer 1989) – i.e.
the flexibility for diverse individuals to incorporate
the object into their system of activity, combined
with robustness in the face of multiple interpreta-
tions. Business plans get used by design engineers as
well as venture capitalists (Henderson 1991).
However, above all these objects, the articulation
of opportunity has occupied a central position in the
scholarly field over the past 10 years (Dimov 2011;
Shane 2000; Shane and Eckhardt 2003;
Venkataraman 1997). Boundaries are gaps, like dif-
ferences in relative expertise and knowledge
domains (Greer et al. 2005), reflecting the informa-
tion and knowledge asymmetry of an entrepreneurial
agent and potential stakeholders to act and interact
on an innovative market opportunity. Therefore, the
opportunity as a boundary object provides a bridge
between individuals (for example, those who per-
ceive an opportunity and those who do not) by trian-
gulating on something in common, by facilitating a
flow of information and knowledge (Carlile 2004)
and by reducing time required for sense-making
(Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Wood and McKinley
2010). Garud and Giuliani (2013) and Bartel and
Garud (2009) have been particularly eloquent on this
point by arguing that narratives act as boundary
objects and that meaningful entrepreneurial narra-
tives involve the definition of an opportunity. In their
words, ‘[M]eaning making involves the definition of
an opportunity as entrepreneurs “plot” sets of social
and material elements from the past, present and
future into a comprehensible narrative’ (Garud and
Giuliani 2013, p. 159). Therefore, entrepreneurs do
more than outline the opportunity for themselves
when they describe opportunities; they typically
wrap familiar stories around opportunities as a way
of translating these opportunities for audiences that
have different knowledge bases. In doing so, they try
to make it easier for other agents to ‘lean on the
world’ (Clark 1997), i.e. to use these objects as ele-
ments in their own distributed systems of cognition
(Smith and Semin 2004, pp. 89–90).
In sum, insights from the transactive memory and
boundary objects literatures fall very naturally into
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the overall perspective of situated cognition research,
with its claim that cognition can be analyzed in terms
of its system-level properties, i.e. in terms of how
ventures think, remember and create. This has impor-
tant implications for entrepreneurial cognition
research, where the traditional focus has been on
individual cognition, on the brain inside its ‘skinbag’
(Clark 1997). The analysis of distributed cognition
therefore opens up several possibilities for freshly
conceptualizing cognition in entrepreneurship.
Discussion of future
research directions
Inventorying situated cognition at work
in entrepreneurship
In this final section of the paper, we explore future
entrepreneurship research that might exploit the fore-
going overlapping theses of embedded, grounded and
distributed cognition. We start with the need for
inventorying examples of situated cognition that are
more and less frequently occurring in the entrepre-
neurship domain, a task we see as vital at this stage of
the research. Our first observation pertains to objects.
In the course of their work, entrepreneurs use and
create a rich variety of physical and conceptual
objects, some of which have already seen extensive
study (such as business plans and product ideas) and
some which have not (such as physical office con-
figuration and the organization of information on
computers). Recent work by Clarke (2011) and
Cornelissen et al. (2012) has previously pointed the
way to documenting these phenomena, and much
more could be done, including the reinterpretation of
both primary and secondary sources that were origi-
nally created without the intention of documenting
instances of situated cognition (for example: Chen
et al. 2009; or Uzzi 1997). In general, we encourage
research that leverages the natural setting of entre-
preneurial activities in order to gather as much infor-
mation as possible about the ways in which
entrepreneurs leverage ‘tools and other artifacts,
aspects of the environment, other people and groups’
(Smith and Semin 2004, p. 89).
Our second suggestion pertains to the entrepre-
neurial process. There is a long history in entrepre-
neurship research investigating steps in the process by
which entrepreneurs advance new venture creation
(Gartner 2004). Because that literature has made good
progress in operationalization, methods and measures
can readily be adopted and adapted to investigate how
situated entrepreneurial cognition maps onto different
steps in the entrepreneurial process. For example,
Zheng (2012) cites that Google’s two founders
worked together at Stanford University for several
years before starting the firm, implying that they
learned to transact memory in the pre-firm period.
Therefore, as one example of mapping the elements of
situated cognition to venture stage, research might
usefully examine whether transactive memory is gen-
erally more important in the very early days of a
venture, or in more established small and medium-
sized enterprises and inter-firm networks (Majchrzak
et al. 2007).
Third, some innovation in research methods is
encouraged, particularly the use of photography and
video to evidence phenomenon of interest. A canoni-
cal example of this is Hutchins’ various studies of
navigation (Hutchins 1995a,b, 2005) that use a care-
fully crafted anthropological approach, with ample
capture of the phenomenon of interest using modern
media tools. Hutchins point is to capture evidence of
the interplay of multiple distributed elements in cog-
nition. Ultimately, Hutchins wants us to realize that
there are times when it is useful to dispense almost
entirely with studying cognition by focusing on what
goes on inside an individual mind and, instead, focus
on properties of the external system going on around
the individual. One of his arguments is that an advan-
tage of this approach to studying cognition is that one
can use direct observation and photography to record
phenomena of interest. Nicolini et al. (2012), Clarke
and Cornelissen (2011) and Cornelissen et al. (2012)
similarly use visual ethnographic approaches to good
effect, but such methodological innovations remain
quite rare in the literature.
Fourth, the examples of data-gathering above
point to another and equally promising avenue of
future research that emerges from the fact that the
three theses of situated entrepreneurial cognition are
not independent categories and do not necessarily
represent a singular construct. For instance, embed-
ding and grounding can be argued to also imply
distributed cognition. In our exposition of these con-
cepts, we have exerted care to give the three theses
different foci in order to reduce these overlaps, but
we acknowledge that others might disagree with our
categorization (e.g. Hutchins, 1995b; or Smith and
Semin 2004). Therefore, cleanly operationalizing the
different conceptual elements within situated entre-
preneurial cognition offers an excellent opportunity
for contribution and advancement of theory around
the phenomenon.
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Theory and empirical evidence linking situated
cognition to DVs, and moderators thereof
Again in the spirit of building on prior work, over the
years there has been extensive work on entrepre-
neurial outcomes (Mayer-Haug et al. 2013). For
many researchers, the true value of entrepreneurial
cognition research lies in linking cognitive phenom-
ena to dependent variables meaningful in the entre-
preneurial context (Mitchell et al. 2007). The
traditional variables around venture performance,
growth and failure rates are highly relevant here as
ultimate measures of the impact of cognitive perfor-
mance in entrepreneurship. However, there are also
more proximate variables that seem highly appropri-
ate as meaningful measures of the impact of ele-
ments of situated cognition, and that have relatively
straightforward theoretical links to elements of situ-
ated cognition. Examples include measures of sense-
giving impact (e.g. ease and speed of comprehension
of embodied concepts), measures of the impact and
effectiveness of boundary objects (e.g. business
plans, prototypes, venture stories: Bartel and Garud
2009), measures of success in entraining stakehold-
ers (e.g. to raise funding, obtain social support, other
needed resources: Martens et al. 2007), and meas-
urements of top team performance in ventures (e.g.
impact of transactive memory: e.g. Zheng 2012).
Theoretically informed moderators of these rela-
tionships might include some that are entrepreneur
focused (such as experience and/or expertise), some
that vary with the venture type (such as the pace of
venture development and novelty of the offering) and
some that reflect environment type (such as the
degree of uncertainty). These features of the entre-
preneurial situation offer special advantages to future
researchers as they enable testing of the circum-
stances in which elements of situated cognition
matter more or less. For example, Cornelissen and
Clarke (2010, p. 544) hypothesize that the use of
embodied conceptualizations is a function of the
degree to which an entrepreneur has had previous
experiences in the same or similar industries, with
novice entrepreneurs expected to rely more on
embodied concepts, while entrepreneurs with rel-
evant industry experience are expected to use indus-
try analogies that are known to them. Serial and
lifelong entrepreneurs experience large numbers of
outcomes in the course of their entrepreneurial jour-
neys and, from theoretical perspectives on expertise
and heuristics, these events are likely to shape their
cognition moving ahead (Mitchell et al. 2000), such
as whether they take a more effectual or predictive
approach to venturing (Sarasvathy 2001). It would be
valuable to understand whether experienced and/or
expert entrepreneurs also differ from novice entre-
preneurs in how they exploit cognitive embed-
dedness, embodiment and distributed cognition and
– if they do – how such differences relate to effec-
tuation or predictive approaches (Sarasvathy and
Venkataraman 2011).
With regard to the pace of venture development
and novelty level, scholars have been aware ever
since Eisenhardt’s (1989) studies that high velocity
decision-making involves using information more
intensively, not less. It would be valuable to under-
stand how the elements of situated cognition are
involved in using information more intensively, since
the principles of bounded cognition would imply that
decision-makers will have to find ways of stretching
their cognitive resources (Tribble 2005), potentially
by leaning more intensively on their environment,
each other and bodies. The same logic applies to
highly technical, high novelty ventures where we
know little about what types of cognitive supports
entrepreneurs use routinely and more/less inten-
sively. Does novelty drive more or less intensive use
of transactive memory? Or is it prototyping that is
more intensively used for scaffolding cognition in
highly novel ventures?
Finally, the impact of uncertainty is a perennial
issue for entrepreneurship scholars. How is cognition
scaffolded in high uncertainty situations? Are there
important differences between high and low uncer-
tainty contexts? For example, to what extent is busi-
ness planning a cognitive scaffold and how does it
vary in low and high uncertainty environments
(Gruber 2007)?
How much influence do people have on their own
situated cognition?
Looking ahead to future research, another key issue
is how much influence individuals exert on their own
situated cognition. The ship pilot, in conjunction
with the shipwright who constructed the pilothouse
with its cognitive extension tools, appears to exert
proactive control over the cognitive elements
involved in navigating a ship.Yet, a parallel stream of
research assigns cognitive abilities to far more innate
variables that include genetics, hormones and
hardwiring (Barkow et al. 1992; Nicolaou et al.
2008; White et al. 2007). Therefore, there is an
important opportunity to untangle the role of
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individual agency in its own situated cognition by
investigating when and how entrepreneurs build the
scaffolding that supports their cognition, and the
consequences of that. Importantly, from a situated
cognition perspective, there is a case for supposing
that using environmental supports (via embedding,
distributing and embodying mechanisms) has long-
term (and maybe short-term) consequences for our
inner cognitive capacities; that it is unlikely that the
‘inner machine’ is left the same as before (Sterelny
2010). The scaffold-constructing activities of entre-
preneurs may be culturally transmitted over decades
or centuries, but perhaps also over shorter periods of
time (consider, for example, the influence of the now
ubiquitous Microsoft Powerpoint as a cognitive
crutch). Thus, researchers ought to study the impli-
cations of situated cognition for the full range of
ways in which entrepreneurs might be constructing
and re-constructing cognitive capabilities over time.
Philosophical differences
Finally, we would be remiss not to remind readers
that there are also a number of thorny philosophical
differences that arise out of research on situated cog-
nition. The philosophy literature around situated cog-
nition has fiercely debated the meaning of so much
cognitive learning on the world. For example,
Hutchins (1995b) sees the mental realm as being
unevenly distributed across the elements of a system
that incorporates material objects, body and others.
Analyzing in this way leads Hutchins to suggest that
it makes more sense to see the cockpit of the aircraft
(the system) rather than the pilot as remembering its
speed. Clark and Chalmers (1998) famously used a
thought experiment about Otto, an Alzheimer suf-
ferer who uses a notebook as a substitute for his
memory (information residing on one’s iPhone being
another example: Clark 2008). By focusing on the
isomorphism and parity between notebook and
memory, Clark and Chalmers argue that cognition
need not be conceptualized as only what is inside the
head, but can, instead, be analyzed as an extended
system. Sutton (2010) argues that the more one
studies the mind, the more one realizes that it is
powerful precisely because it co-opts external
resources that complement its internal capabilities.
For new venture teams, different team members can
be thought of as similarly providing specialized cog-
nitive resources to one another. However, some
researchers (e.g. Wilson 2002) strongly object to
conceptualizing cognition as extended, and others
(e.g. Sterelny 2010) point out that many human
capacities, not just cognition, ‘depend on the fact that
humans engineer their environment to support their
activities’ (p. 466), and hence argue that situated
cognition is a special case of the more general phe-
nomenon that human capabilities are environmen-
tally scaffolded. Therefore, we think that some
entrepreneurial cognition researchers will balk at the
idea of cognition being conceptualized as looping
outside the head, and the various differing perspec-
tives on the meaning of situated cognition in the
specific domain of entrepreneurship will demand
continued attention in the literature.
Conclusion
We conclude by emphasizing that we share the wish
of other scholars to see entrepreneurship research
fundamentally socialize the entrepreneur, in a broad
sense of the term (Venkataraman et al. 2012). We
believe that the literature reviewed in this paper
offers an important point of departure for novel
research on entrepreneurial cognition, because it puts
the whole person into the analysis, richly connected
with other agents, incorporating their entire corpus
and interacting with a material world full of ordinary
objects that have surprising cognitive lives. We there-
fore sense a tremendous opportunity to incorporate a
truly situated conception of cognition into existing
research on entrepreneurship where, despite some
significant work that moves the field in this direction
(Cornelissen and Clarke 2010; Mitchell et al. 2011;
Randolph-Seng et al. in press), to date it remains an
underexplored opportunity.
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